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constantly present with respect to personal property which must pass its
time in other taxing jurisdictions," a standard should be formulated which
allows consideration of the practical risk involved rather than, as the instant
case seems to do, allow a full tax by the domicile in a fact situation which,
as a practical matter, presents no greater danger of the offensive double
taxation than did previous situations where the full domicile tax was
denied. 37
JOHN D. O'REILLY, III
Contracts—Impossibility Occurring after Breach Limits Damages.—
Model Vending, Inc. v. Stanisci.'—Plaintiff and defendant entered into a
written agreement whereby plaintiff was to have the exclusive right to
place vending machines in defendant's bowling alley for a period of five
years. Eleven months later defendant breached the contract by commencing
to sell similar merchandise at his newly established snack bar. Plaintiff
filed suit for breach of contract and resulting damages for loss of profits
for the entire term of the contract, but while the suit was pending 2 de-
fendant's bowling alley was destroyed by fire. HELD: The destruction of
the premises on which the contract was to be performed made the contract
impossible of performance as of that date, and although defendant had
breached the contract before the fire, plaintiff was entitled to recover only
for loss of profits up to the time of the fire and not for the entire term of
the contract. 3
Full damages have been recovered when the promisor's breach causes
the loss resulting from the supervening impossibility to shift to the promisee.
Thus, in Mills v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America"' full damages were
recovered against defendant subcontractor's surety when, after breach by
the subcontractor and the consequent resumption of certain bridgework
by the plaintiff, the bridgework was destroyed by fire. The court said,
"While the high water was the immediate cause of the loss, he would not
have been placed in the position to have incurred the loss had it not been
for the wrongful act of the Metal Products Company."5
The instant court, finding no precedent in New Jersey,° gathered sup-
35 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., supra note 25; Standard Oil v. Peck,
supra note 23, at 384.
37 Standard Oil v. Peck, supra note 23,
74 N.J. Super. 12, 180 A.2d 393 (1962).
2 See Brief for Defendant, p. 1.
3 The following articles are of particular interest on the general topic: Conlon,
The Doctrine of Frustration as Applied to Contracts, 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 87 (1922);
Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich. L.
Rev. 589 (1920); Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 943 (1942) ; Smith, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Con-
solidation, 58 Colum. L, Rev. 287, 307 (1958).
4 114 W.Va. 263, 171 S.E. 532 (1933).
5 Ibid.
6 The court was perhaps moved by the decision in Von Waldheim v. Englewood
Heights Estates, 115 N.J.L. 220, 179 Atl• 19 (1935), where plaintiff, a defaulting buyer
under an installment contract for the sale of real estate, was held entitled to a return
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CASE NOTES
port by analogizing7
 to authority concerning anticipatory repudiation fol-
lowed by events making performance of the act contracted for illega1.8
The loss in such instances "should rest where chance has placed it; and
the same should be true in case of any supervening excusable impossibility." 9
In the case at hand, the breach was total but there had been actual
failure to perform only part of the promisor's undertaking before the im-
possibility occurred.")
 Regarding this particular set of circumstances, the
court cited Williston" and Restatement of Contracts' 2 in approval of the
rule announced. Comment d of the Restatement provides:
Impossibility on the part of a promisor occurring after he has
committed a breach does not'ordinarily discharge him, but it will
do so if the breach consists merely of an anticipatory repudiation. 13
After a breach of any other kind impossibility supervening before
the time for full performance has elapsed will limit the damages
recoverable if the impossibility would have occurred had there been
no breach.'' Thus, if an employer or employee who breaks his
contract becomes so ill shortly afterwards that the contract could
not have been performed, recovery will be limited.' 8
 (Footnotes
supplied.)
of the consideration he had paid on the contract when the property was condemned
by the state, the award having been paid over to the seller. The case, however, could
not serve as authority since it specifically called attention to the fact that the seller had
waived the defendant's past breaches by not insisting upon a forfeiture; and, since
subsequently the lands were merely "taken by another buyer, the state, under the
Eminent Domain Act," the seller was in no way damaged. 115 N.J.L. at 224, 179
AU. at 21.
7
 Since the court felt prone to analogize, it is submitted that the law of torts
would have served as one more area in support of the rule announced. Under the
"but for" rule the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event if the event would
have occurred without it. See Prosser, Torts 220 (2d ed. 1955); McLaughlin, Proxi-
mate Cause, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 155 (1925); Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of
Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 106, 109 (1911); Restatement; Contracts § 432(1) (1934).
As to limiting damages in the field of tort see Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Dam-
age, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1127 (1934).
8
 Supra note 1, at 16, 180 A.2d at 395-96, citing 6 Williston, Contracts § 1759 (rev.
ed. 1938).
9 Id. at 16, 180 A.2d at 396.
10 Ibid .
11
 Id. "In the second situation supposed the amount of recovery should be limited
if it can be shown that the remaining performance due from the defendant after the
breach would have been excused by impossibility. Thus, in an action on a contract of
employment, broken by the wrongful discharge of the servant, evidence should be
admitted of the employer's death after the breach but during the term of the promised
services." 6 Williston, Contracts § 1967A; see, e.g., Rubin v. Segal, 188 App. Div. 636,
177 N.Y. Supp. 342 (1919).
12
 Supra note 1, at 17, 180 A.2d at 396-97, citing Restatement, Contracts § 457,
comment d (1932).
13
 Fratelli Pantanella, S. A. v. International Commercial Corp., 89 N.Y.S.2d 736
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
14
 Cf. Dale v. Commonwealth, 101 Ky. 612, 42 S.W. 93 (1897). Pardon of the
accused by the Governor after forfeiture of his bond by his departure from the court
before conclusion of trial held not to relieve his sureties from liability.
35 Rubin v. Segal, supra note 11.
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The court noted that Professor Corbin was in apparent disagreement
both with Williston and the Restatement, 16 but reasoned that his statement
was evidently intended to apply only to situations of supervening impossi-
bility occurring after the entire time for performance of the executory
contract had expired. 17
Naturally, had plaintiff's suit for loss of profits for the entire term
of the contract been successfully concluded one day before the fire, there
could be no contention that damages should thereafter be limited. However,
these were not the facts before the court, and to allow full damages on
the basis of the breach alone is to deny that the primary aim in measuring
damages in the field of contract law is to arrive at compensation.ig The
damages for breach of contract should place the plaintiff in the position he
would have been in had there been no breach. 19 And had there been no
breach, there nevertheless would have remained the fire. In such a situa-
tion, the normally operative rule as to impossibility discharging the promisor
from further performance should and would prevail."
An analogous situation often exists when plaintiff, after having filed
suit for breach of contract, is thereafter allowed to recover for damages
occurring to the time of tria1.21 It seems reasonable, therefore, that if
damages under particular circumstances can be increased, then it should
follow that damages under particular circumstances can be decreased. Thus
the court in In re Griffin Mfg. Co., 22 in allowing plaintiff to prove dam-
ages occurring subsequent to the commencement of the action, likewise
aided the defendant bankrupt by taking judicial notice of the panic of
1929 in mitigation of such damages.
In reaching a decision founded on analogy and logic, and thereby ad-
justing the loss between the parties, it would appear that the Stanisci
court has made the law of impossibility a little more possible to live with.
ALAN H. ROBBINS
Contributor
Corporations—Appraisal Statutes--Who May Seek Appraisal under the
Statute.—Bache f..1 Co. v. General Instruments Corp.1—Bache & Co., a
stock brokerage firm, was the registered owner of 33,400 shares of the corn-
le Supra note 1, at 18, 180 A.2d at 397, citing 6 Corbin, Contracts 	 1341 (1951).
"Impossibility of performance caused by death of a person or by destruction of the sub-
ject matter is not operative as a discharge if the breach for which suit is brought occurred
before there was any such impossibility."
17 See Holt Mfg. Co. v. Thornton, 136 Cal. 232, 68 Pac. 708 (1902), where, under
a contract to harvest wheat to commence on July 5, appellant did not begin work
until July 15 after a large amount of the grain had shelled out. Accord, 011inger &
Bruce Dry Dock Co. v. James Gibbony & Co., 202 Ala. 516, 81 So. 18 (1919).
18 Fratelli Pantanella, S. A. v. International Commercial Corp., supra note 13;
McCormick, Damages 560 (1935) and cases cited therein.
19 Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 Atl. 641 (1929).
20 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.13. 1863).
21 Losei Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 254 N.Y. 41, 171 N.E. 899 (1930).
22 43 F,2d 624 (N.D. Ga. 1930).
1 74 N.J. Super. 92, 180 A.2d 535 (1962).
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